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1. 1. 1.
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 1
Campylobacter is a major cause of foodborne disease worldwide (Havelaar et al., 2015) . The pathogen is 2 believed to be responsible for about nine million cases of human campylobacteriosis per year in 3 countries of the European Union (EU), with an estimated cost to the EU economy of approximately EUR 4 2.4 billion per year (EFSA, 2015) . Chicken meat is a well-known source of Campylobacter; in 2010 the 5 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) estimated that between 20% and 30% of the total cases of 6 campylobacteriosis across the EU can be attributed to the handling, preparation and consumption of 7 broiler meat while 50% to 80% may be attributed to the chicken reservoir as a whole (EFSA, 2010) . Campylobacter is rarely detected before 10 to 14 days after the beginning of the production cycle ( run and the cumulative distribution obtained for Cday + used to estimate the daily probability of a flock 96 becoming infected. Therefore, the chances that each day has to be Cday + were finally modelled as: 97
Where dpday is the day of final depopulation and p Table 1 . 185 tested against different levels of WFP (from 0.1 to 1 by 0.025) and results of generated scenarios 248 assessed. A similar approach was used for the day of final depopulation; as dpday is one of the few 249 inputs of the model directly influenced by the management; changes in %HCFs as a function of a change 250 in this parameter was assessed simulating 10 different scenarios (dpday ± 5days). 251
2.7.
Uncertainty in the baseline scenario. The effects of the interventions under investigation on 252 %HCFs were estimated by comparing the outputs of the different scenarios obtained by means of 253
Monte Carlo Simulations with that of the baseline. The effects were estimated using a standard broiler 254 flock as baseline; therefore, certain flock characteristics were assumed and although the production 255 process of broiler chickens is highly standardized, in reality, some inputs such as Nb, d_rate or dpday 256 might be different amongst the farms. The same applies to the initial number of infected at Cday + which 257 is intuitively strictly dependent on the source of Campylobacter infection and for which the effect is 258 typically unknown. Those inputs are expected to have an impact on the WFP and consequently on Fl and 259 %HCFs (Figure 1) , therefore, to quantify those effects, the baseline values were replaced by distributions 260 (Table 2) The minimum values of 5000 and 1% were maintained for the uncertainty distribution representing Nb and d_rate respectively.
271
Simulation. The risk analysis software @Risk (version 7.0.1 for Excel, Palisade Corporation, Newfield, 272 NY) was used for the simulations and sensitivity analysis. Statistical software R 3.3.0 was used for the 273 graphs. 274
RESULTS RESULTS RESULTS RESULTS
275
Baseline model 276
Following the flowchart reported in Figure 1 , the following results were obtained for the steps driving to 277 the proportion of highly contaminated flocks in the baseline model. 278 3.1.1. Age at which the flock became infected. The cumulative probability distribution representing the 279 chances of a given day being the day of infection is presented in Figure 2 . The distribution indicates that 280
there is a probability of 35.67% that the day of infection falls in the range 10-28 days, 73.06% in the 281 range 10-35 days and 98.35% in the range 10-42 days.
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Spread of infection. Following the estimation of the parameters obtained by the MLE (Eq.6), the 283
Gamma distribution describing the rate resulted: 284 ‫݁ݐܽݎ‬ = ‫ܽ݉݉ܽܩ‬ሺ652.2; 0.0010ሻ (Eq.14) 285
The distribution shows a mean of 0.698 with a standard deviation of 0.027. The effect of the uncertainty 286 surrounding the parameter when the logistic growth model was adapted to the baseline scenario, 287 (Nb=20,000 chicken broilers with one initial infected at t 0 ) is shown in Figure 3 . Assuming t 0 = 0 for the 288 purpose of illustrating the effect of the variability and the uncertainty, it takes from two to three weeks 289 from the day of infection before the WFP reaches the 100%. 290
Within flock prevalence. 291
Over 100,000 simulated flocks, the WFP at slaughter resulted equal to 46.35% on average. The 292 cumulative distribution together with the probability density is reported in Figure 4 is reported (Figure 5 ). In the baseline model, the average value recovered for Fl was 1.83 log CFU/g, with 296 a standard deviation of 2.7 log CFU/g. The value at 95 th percentile was 7.6 log CFU/g with 18.8% of 297 infected flocks showing a contamination greater to 5.09 log CFU/g. The result of the sensitivity analysis 298 outlined as tornado chart with the inputs ranked by effect on the output mean is reported in Figure 6 . 299
Considering that Fl is calculated from the estimated level of contamination of a pooled sample (Eq.10), 300 this value is directly dependent on the number of infected birds in the flock (Eq.8-9). In fact, the tornado 301 chart clearly shows that the Cday + (which determines WFP) is the input with the greater influence on the 302 output. On the other hand, the parameters rate and the distribution describing C c shown a limited 303 impact on IF, in fact, the average of Fl ranged from 1.52 to 2.11 log CFU/g as a function of rate and from 304 
Effects of mitigation strategies 309
The estimated %HCFs for the scenarios in which enhanced biosecurity (B+T-), partial depopulation (B-T+) 310 or both management options were enabled (B+T+), are reported in Table 3 . The confidence limits 311 associated to the RRa of the factors under investigation were used in Eq.11-13 so that the 'best' and the 312 'worst' scenarios reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the estimates were reported. 313 As expected, the application of biosecurity measures reduced the predicted %HCFs. Conversely, the 318 thinning practice had a negative impact. Interestingly, when both, the biosecurity measures and the 319 thinning practice were adopted, the combined effect of the factors was not conclusive, in fact, the 320 uncertainty surrounding the effects led to a reduced and increased proportion of highly contaminated 321 flocks when the best and the worst scenarios respectively were assessed. For each on-farm mitigation 322 strategy aimed at reducing the microbial load in colonized animals, the distributions describing Fl (mean, 323 5 th and 95 th percentile) and %HCFs are reported in Table 4 . 324 
The graph representing the changes in WFP as a function of different expected resistance (expressed as 328 decreasing rate) against Campylobacter colonization are reported in Figure 7 , while the respective 329 effects on the distributions describing Fl (mean, 5 th and 95 th percentile) and %HCFs are reported in Table  330 5. 331 The graph representing the general relationship of the reduction in %HCFs as a function of the expected 336 reduction effect on the caecal load (-log CFU/g) and WFP is reported in Figure 8 and that showing the 337 expected reduction in %HCFs as a function of dpday (±1-5days) is presented in Figure 9 . 338
As expected, %HCFs is greatly impacted by the transmission rate; a reduction of 10% in the rate of 339 transmission led to a 50% decrease of the probability of highly contaminated flocks at slaughter with 340 respect to the baseline. should be taken into account. In fact, the sensitivity analysis reported in Figure 9 , clearly showed how 412 variations in those inputs might lead to significant consequences; as a practical example, if dpday is 413 anticipated by two days or Nb decrease by 5000 units, the baseline proportion of %HCFs decreased by 414 28% and increased by 8,7% respectively (results not shown). With respect to this, particularly useful is 415 the general trend reproducing the changes in %HCFs as a function of dpday outlined in Figure 9 . As 416 previously highlighted, dpday is only dependent on production management and the expected %HCFs 417 sent to abattoirs should be an integral part of the economic rationale behind the choice of dpday. Mitigation strategies aimed at reducing the microbial load in colonized animals such as bacteriophages or bacteriocins.
